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      ABSTRACT  
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same 
philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don´t understand why it has to be so. It is 
because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there 
continues to be a verb ´to be´ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ´to eat and to drink´, as long as we still 
have the adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an 
expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring 
at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the 
transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see the limits of human understanding´, they believe of 
course that they can see beyond these.`` ´ This quote is from Ludwig Wittgenstein who redefined philosophy some 
70 years ago (but most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has been a philosopher for some 40 
years, is one of them. It is also curious that both he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous 
Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but Searle got the point and Dennett did not, 
(though it is stretching things to call Searle or Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett is a hard determinist (though he tries 
to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose famous book ´The Concept of Mind´(1949) 
continues to be reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the ghost but it left the machine. Dennett enjoys 
making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) have exposed in detail. Our use of the words 
consciousness, choice, freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, event(and so on 
endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion but as soon as we leave normal life and enter philosophy(and any 
discussion detached from the environment in which language evolved) chaos reigns. Like most Dennett lacks a 
coherent framework-which Searle has called the logical structure of rationality. I have expanded on this considerably 
since I wrote this review and my recent articles show in detail what is wrong with Dennett's approach to philosophy. 
Let me end with another quote from Wittgenstein--´Ambition is the death of thought´.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may 
consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested 
in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature and the 
Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we  are still occupied  with  the 
same philosophical problems   as  were   the Greeks.  But the  people who say this  don´t  understand why it 
has to be so.  It is because our language has remained the same and   keeps seducing us into  asking the 
same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ´to  be´ that  looks as if it  functions  in the  same 
way as ´to eat´ and  ´to  drink´, as   long as we still have the adjectives  ´identical´, ´true´,   ´false´,  ´possible´, 
as long as we continue to  talk of a river of time, of  an expanse of space, etc., etc., people  will 
keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and  find themselves staring at something which no 
explanation  seems capable of  clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, 
because, insofar as people think they can see `the limits of human understanding´,  they believe of course 
that they can see beyond these.`` 
 
´´Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language`` 
 
``Ambition is the death of thought´´ 
 
These three quotes are from Ludwig Wittgenstein, who redefined philosophy some 70  years ago (but  most 
people have  yet to find this out).   Dennett, though he has been a  philosopher for some 40 years, is one 
them. It is also curious that both he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous 
Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but Searle got the point and Dennett 
did not. Dennett is a hard determinist (though he tries to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is 
due to Ryle, whose famous book ´The Concept of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book did a 
great job of exorcising the ghost but it left the machine.  Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, 
Ryle (and many others since) have exposed in detail. By accident, just before this book, I had read ´´The 
Minds I´´, which Dennett coauthored with Douglas Hofstadter in 1981. They made some bad mistakes (see 
my review), and saddest of all, they reprinted two famous articles that pointed the way out of the mess---
Nagel´s `What is like to be a  bat?` and an  early version of John  Searle´s  Chinese Room argument explaining  
why computers don´t think. 
 
Nagel pointed out that we do not even know how to recognize what a concept of a bat´s mind would be 
like.  Searle similarly explained how we lack a  way to conceptualize   thinking and how it differs from what 
a computer does (e.g., it can translate Chinese without understanding it). Likewise, we lack a clear test for 
recognizing what counts as good vs bad--or just intelligible-- for  many philosophical and scientific concepts. 
Our use of the words consciousness, choice, freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, 
cause, happened, event(and so on  endlessly)  are  rarely a source of confusion  but as soon as we leave 
normal life and enter philosophy(and any discussion detached from the environment in which  language  
evolved) chaos  reigns. Wittgenstein was the first to understand why and to point out how to avoid this. 
Unfortunately, he died in his prime, his works are composed 
almost entirely of a series of examples of how the mind (language) works, and he never wrote any  
popular books,  so  understanding  of his work is restricted  to a very few. 
 
Searle  is one  of  the world´s leading philosophers  and has written  many  extremely  clear and highly 
regarded  articles  and books,  some of which  have  pointed out the  glaring  defects in Dennett´s work.  His 
review ``Consciousness Explained Away´´ of Dennett’s 1991 book `´Consciousness Explained´´ and his  
book  ´´The  Mystery of Consciousness´´ are  very well  known,  and show, in a way that is  amazingly clear 
for philosophical writing, why neither Dennett (nor any of the hundreds of philosophers and scientists who 
have written on this topic) have come close to explaining the hard problem—i.e., how do you conceptualize 
consciousness. Many suspect we will never be able to ‘conceptualize’ any of the really important things 
(though I think W made it clear that they are mixing up the very hard scientific issue with the very simple 
issue of how to use the word), but it is clear that we are nowhere near it now as a scientific issue. My own 
view is that the scientific issue is straightforward as we can see ‘consciousness’ being put 
together a few neurons at a time by evolution and by development. And the ‘concept’ is a 
language game like any others and one just needs to get clear (specify clear COS) about how we 
will use the word.  
 
Dennett has mostly ignored his critics but has favored Searle with vituperative personal attacks. Searle has 
been accused by Dennett and others of being out to destroy  cognitive psychology which is quite funny as 
modern philosophy is (mostly) a branch of cognitive psychology and Searle has made it very clear for 30 
years that WE are a good example of a biological machine that is conscious, thinks,  etc.  He just points out 
that we don´t have any idea how this happens. Searle characterizes as ´´intellectual pathology´´, the views 
of Dennett and all  those who deny the existence  of the very phenomena they set  out to  explain.  
 
Dennett repeats his mistakes here and leaves his reply to his critics to the penultimate page of the book, 
where we are told that they are all mistaken and it is a waste of space to show how!   Unsurprisingly, there 
is not one reference to Wittgenstein or Searle in the entire book. There are however, many references to 
other old school philosophers who are as confused as he is. It is scientism writ large—the almost universal 
mistake of mixing together the real empirical issue of science with the issues of how the language is to be 
used (language games) of philosophy.  
 
Like most people, it does not cross his mind that the  very  inference  engines  he thinks with are forcing 
him to come to  certain  conclusions and  that these  will  often  be quite unconnected with or wrong about 
the way things are in the world. They are a jumble of evolutionary curiosities which do various tasks in 
organizing behavior that were useful for survival hundreds of thousands of years ago.  Wittgenstein   was a 
pioneer in doing thought experiments in cognitive psychology and began to elucidate the nature of these 
engines and the subtleties of  language  in the  30´s, and thus he made  the sorts of comments that this 
review begins with. 
 
Dennett says (p98) that his view is compatibilism, i.e., that free will (which I hope, for coherence, we can 
equate with choice) is compatible with determinism (i.e., that ´´there is at any instant exactly one 
physically possible future´´--p25).  He wants to show that determinism is not the same as inevitability. 
However, the whole book is smoke and mirrors by means of which choice, in the sense we normally 
understand it, disappears and we are left with ``choice``, which is something we cannot choose. Naturally, 
this echoes the fate of consciousness in  his earlier book  ``Consciousness  Explained``. 
It is remarkable that, at a time  when we are  just beginning to  reach  the  point  where we might be able to 
understand the basics of how a single neuron works(or how an  atom works for that matter), that anyone 
should think they can make the leap to understanding the whole brain and to explain its most complex 
phenomena. Please recall the last sentence of Wittgenstein from the opening quote: ´´ And what´s more, this  
satisfies a longing forthe transcendent, because, insofar as people think they  can see `the limits of human 
understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond   these.`` The  relation between language, 
thought and reality is  extraordinarily complex and everyone gets lost.  If one is very, very careful, we can 
lay out the language games (e.g., specify the Conditions of Satisfaction of various statements using the 
words consciousness and mind) and clarity becomes possible, but Dennett throws caution to the winds and 
we are dragged into the quicksand. 
 
There are at least 3 different topics here (evolution of our brain, choice and morality) and Dennett tries 
vainly to weld them together into a coherent account of how freedom evolves from the deterministic 
crashing of atoms. There is, however, no compelling  reason to accept that bouncing atoms (or his favorite 
example, the game of life running on a computer) are  isomorphic with reality. He knows that quantum 
indeterminacy (or the uncertainty principle) is a major obstacle to determinism, however  defined (and has  
been taken  by many  as an escape to  freedom), but dismisses it due to the fact  that such events are too 
rare to bother with. By extension, it’s unlikely that any such event will happen now or even in our whole  
lifetime in our  brain, so we appear to be stuck with a determined brain (whatever that may be). However, 
the universe is a big place and it’s been  around a long  time (perhaps ‘forever’) and if even one such 
quantum effect occurs it would seem to throw the whole universe into an indeterminate state.  The  
notion ´´there  is  at any instant exactly one physically possible future´´ cannot be true if at any instant a 
quantum indeterminacy can occur--in this  case  there would  seem to be  infinitely many possible  futures.  
This recalls one of the escapes from the contradictions of physics—each instant our  universe is branching 
into  infinitely many universes. 
He correctly rejects the idea that quantum indeterminacy gives us the answer to how we can have choice.  
This obvious idea has been suggested by many but the problem is that nobody has any idea how to specify 
an exact sequence of steps which starts with the equations of physics and ends up with the phenomena of 
consciousness (or any other emergent phenomenon).  If so, they will definitely win at least one Nobel Prize, 
for not only will they have ‘explained’ consciousness, they will have ‘explained’ (or much better ‘described’ 
as Wittgenstein insisted) the universal phenomenon of emergence (how higher order properties emerge 
from lower ones). So, they would have to solve the ´easy´ problem (to determine the exact state of the brain 
corresponding to some mental state and preferably specify the exact position of all the atoms in the brain 
over time-ignoring uncertainty) and the ´hard´ one (what  exactly correlates with or produces consciousness 
or choice etc.?). And while they are at it how about also doing the impossible--an exact and full solution to 
the quantum field equations for a brain. It is very well known that these equations are uncomputable, even 
for one atom or a vacuum, as it would require an infinite amount of computer time.  But infinite will do for 
one atom so maybe a brain will take no longer. It never crosses his mind (nor anyone I have seen) that 
nobody can make clear how an atom ‘emerges’ from electrons, neutrons and protons or a molecule emerges 
from atoms nor cells from molecules etc. Yes there are some equations but if you look carefully you will see 
lots of hand waving and facts that are just accepted as ‘the way things are’ and so I think it clearly is the 
same with consciousness, color, choice, pain emerging from bunches of cells.  
 
He starts off on the first page appealing to the laws  of  physics for   protection  against fantastic notions 
such as immaterial souls, but physics is made of notions just as fantastic (uncertainty, entanglement, 
wave/particle duality, Schrodinger´s dead/alive cat etc.) and as Feynmann said many times ``Nobody 
understands physics!´´ Many think nobody ever will and I am one of many who say there is nothing to 
‘understand’ but rather there is just lots of ‘things’ along with existence, space, time, matter etc. to accept. 
There is a limit to what our  tiny brain can do and maybe we are at that limit now. 
 
Even if we create a massive  computer that could understand (in some  sense) far better than we, it is not 
clear that it could explain to us. Understanding an idea requires a certain level of intelligence or power 
(e.g., holding a certain number of things in mind and performing a 
certain number of calculations/second). Most people will never grasp the abstruse math of string theory 
no matter how long they have to do it. Many cannot understand much simpler concepts. So there is good 
reason to suppose that our supersmart computer, even if we teach    it how to think in the ‘same’ sense 
that we do, will never  be able to explain  really complex things  to us. 
 
On the first page is one of his favorite quotes, which compares the brain to a bunch of tiny robots, and on 
pg2 he says that we are made of mindless robots.  The way the brain (and any cell) works is nothing at all 
like the way robots work and we don´t even know how to conceptualize the difference (i.e., we know how 
robots work but not how brains work—e.g., how  do they  make  choices,  understand images and motives 
etc.). As I noted above, this was pointed out by Searle 30 years ago but Dennett (and  countless others) just  
does not get it. 
 
We are also told on the first page that science will let us understand our freedom and give us better 
foundation for our morality. So far as I can see, neither science nor philosophy, nor religion, has any effect 
on our understanding of our freedom or morality.  Although he discusses the biology of altruism and 
rational choice at length, he never mentions the abundant evidence from cognitive psychology that our 
moral intuitions are built in and demonstrable in 4 year old children.  Instead, he spends much time trying 
to show how choice and morality come from memories  of events and  our interaction  with others.  On  pg2 
he says our values have little to do with the goals of our cells and on pg2 to3 that our personality differences 
are due to how our ´´robotic teams are put together, over a lifetime of growth and experience.`` This is a 
bald dismissal of human nature, of the abundant evidence that our differences are to a large extent 
programmed into our genes and fixed in early childhood, and is typical of his constant confused wandering 
back and forth between determinism and environmentalism (i.e., his view that we develop morality over 
time by experience  and by thinking about moral issues). Many other sections of the book show the same 
confusion.  Those who don´t know the evidence may wish to read Pinker´s ´´The Blank Slate´´, Boyer´s 
´´Religion Explained´´ and any of the hundred or so recent texts, and tens of thousands of articles and web 
pages on personality development, and evolutionary and cognitive psychology. 
 
 
On pg4 he  says bison don´t  know they are bison and that we  have known we are mammals for only a few 
hundred years. Both show a fundamental lack of understanding of cognitive psychology. The cognitive 
templates for ontological categories were evolved, in their original forms, hundreds of millions of years ago 
and animals have the inborn ability to recognize others of their species and of other species and classes of 
animals and plants without any learning sufficient to establish categories. Bison know they are like other 
bison and our ancestors knew they were like other mammals and that reptiles were different but similar to 
each other etc.   Cognitive studies have shown these types of abilities in very young children. 
Of course it is true that the words ´bison´ and ´mammal´ are recent, but  they have  nothing to do with 
how our brains work. 
On page 5 he attributes postmodernism´s hostility to science as a product of ´fearful thinking´ but does 
not speculate why that is. In spite of his acquaintance with cognitive psychology he does not see that 
this is likely due to the fact that many science results clash with the feelings normally produced by the 
operation of the inference engines for intuitive psychology, coalition, social mind, social exchange, etc. 
On page 9 he notes that free will is a problem and our attitudes to  it  make  a difference, but for whom? 
Nobody but philosophers. We make choices.  What´s the problem? One has to step outside life to 
experience a problem and then everything becomes a problem. What are consciousness, pain, yellow, 
intention, matter, quarks, gravity etc.? I doubt that any normal person has ever experienced a fundamental 
change in their interactions with people or their decision making processes due to their thinking about  
choice.  This shows that there is something strange about such questions. Wittgenstein shows that the 
language games are different.  There are games for language connected with the cognitive templates for 
Decisions, or seeing colors etc., and thinking philosophically is operating them in decoupled mode.   
Decoupled modes permit thinking about the past, planning for the future, guessing the mental states of 
others, etc., but if one takes the results in the wrong way and starts to think `´John will try to steal my 
wallet´´, rather than just imagining that John might do it, confusion enters and those who cannot turn off the 
decoupled mode or distinguish it from coupled mode, enter the realm of pathology. Some aspects of 
schizophrenia and other mental illness might be seen this way--they lose control of which  mode they are in, 
e.g., not being able to see the  difference between the motives  people  have and the motives they  might 
have. 
 
One can then see much of the philosophizing  people do as operating in these decoupled modes but 
failing to be able to keep in front of them the differences from the normal mode. Normal mode—e.g., 
what is that lion doing-- was undoubtedly the first one evolved  and decoupled modes--what did that lion 
do last time or what does he intend to do next--evolved later. This was probably  never a problem for 
animals--any animal  that  spent too much time worrying about what might happen would not  be very 
successful contributing to  the gene pool. It is interesting to speculate that only when humans developed  
culture and began degenerating genetically, could large numbers of people survive with genes that led them 
to spend alot of time in decoupled modes. Hence, we have philosophy and this book, which is mostly about 
running the decision templates in decoupled mode where there are no real consequences except earning 
royalties for putting the results in a book  for  other people to use to run their engines in decoupled mode. 
Let us alter Wittgenstein´s quote to read: ´´As long as there  continues  to be a  verb ´to decide´ that looks  
as if  it  functions in the  same way as ´to   eat´ and ´to  drink´, as long as we continue to talk of  freedom of 
action, of saying I  wish I had done otherwise, etc., etc., people will  keep stumbling  over the same puzzling  
difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing  up. ´ ´ 
 
As with most philosophy books, nearly every page, often every paragraph, changes from one type of 
language game to another without noticing that now one would have to be joking or dreaming or acting in a 
play or reciting a story, etc., and not actually intending anything nor describing an actual situation in the 
world. On page 10 he says we count on free will for the whole way of thinking about our lives,  like we 
count on food  and  water, but who ever, 
outside philosophy, standing in front of lunch counter full of food, ever thinks how fine it is that they have  
free will so they can pick coke instead of mineral water?  Even if I want to be a serious compatibilist and try 
thinking this in decoupled mode, I have to exit and enter nondecoupled mode to make the actual choice.  
Only then  can I  go back to decoupled  mode to wonder what might have happened if I had not had the 
ability to make a real choice. Wittgenstein noted how pretend games are parasitic on real ones (this is not a 
trivial observation!). The ability to engage in very complex decoupled scenarios is already evident in 4 year 
old children. So I would say that normally, nobody counts on having choice, but rather we just choose.  As 
Wittgenstein made clear it is action based on certainty that is the bedrock of our life. See the recent 
writings of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock.  
 
On the same page he shows again that he does not grasp cognitive basics. He says we learn to conduct our 
lives in the conceptual atmosphere of choice, and that `´It appears to be a stable and ahistorical construct, 
as eternal and  unchanging as arithmetic,  but it is not.´´ And on  page  13--´´It is an  evolved  creation  of  
human activity  and  beliefs´´.  The whole  thrust of  cognitive psychology (and Wittgenstein) is that we do 
NOT learn the basics of  planning, deciding, promising, resenting, etc., but that these are built-in functions 
of the inference engines  that work automatically and unconsciously and start running in very early 
childhood. There is no evidence that they change as we grow, or are in any way subject to  our beliefs, only 
that they mature just as our  body  does. 
On pg 14 he suggests it’s probable that our having free will depends on our believing we have it! Do we 
believe we see an apple, feel a pain, are happy? The language game of belief is very different from that of 
knowing. We can believe we have  a dollar in our  pocket but if we take it out and look at it we can´t  
meaningfully then say that we still believe it (except as a joke etc.). The inference engine can run in 
decoupled (belief) mode so we can imagine having choices or making them, but in life we just make them 
and it is only in very odd situations we can say that we believe we made a choice. But Dennett is saying this 
is the universal case. If making a choice had any dependence on belief than so would everything else--
consciousness, seeing, thinking, etc.  If we take this seriously (and he says ´the serious problems of free 
will´) then we are getting into trouble and if we actually try to apply it to life, then madness is minutes 
away. He, like nearly all philosophers had no clue that Wittgenstein showed us the way out of this need to 
ground our actions on beliefs by describing the actual basis of knowing which is the ungrounded ‘hinges’ or 
automatisms of System 1 thinking in his last work ‘On Certainty’. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has explained this 
over the last decade and I have summarized her work and incorporated it in my reviews and articles.  
. 
On page 65 et seq., he discusses causation, intention and the  `informal  predicates´ that we use to describe 
atoms etc., but cognitive research has shown that we describe all ‘objects’ with  a limited number of 
ontological categories, which we analyze with our intuitive  physics modules, and that when agents (i.e., 
animals or people or things like them—i.e., ghosts  or  gods) are involved we use  our concepts (engines) for 
agency, intuitive psychology, social minds, etc. to  decide how to behave. There is almost certainly no 
causation module but rather it will involve all of these and other inference engines, depending on  the 
precise situation. Discussing possibility and necessity is much   easier if one talks in terms of the output of 
our modules for intuitive physics, agency, ontological categories etc. Of course there is no mention here of 
Wittgenstein´s many incisive comments on causation, intention, deciding, nor of Searle´s now classic works 
on Intention and Social Reality. 
He spends much time on Ainslie´s book ´Breakdown of Will´, in which is discussed the hyperbolic 
discounting faculties (i.e., inference engines) by which we evaluate probable 
outcomes. 
 
He makes much of the excellent work of Robert Frank on altruism, emotion and economics, but the book he 
cites was 15 years old when this book was published. It was Bingham´s idea, amplified by Frank and by Boyd 
and Richardson (1992) that cooperation was greatly stimulated by the evolution of means for punishing 
cheaters. He suggests these as examples of Darwinian approaches that are obligatory and promising. 
Indeed they are, and in fact they are standard parts of economic, evolutionary and cognitive theory, but 
unfortunately, he makes little reference to the other work in these fields. All that work tends to show that 
people do not choose but their brains choose for them. He does not establish any convincing connection 
between this work and the general problem of choice. 
Philosophers of all stripes have been hypnotized by their ability to decouple the inference engines to play 
`what if´´ games, loving to put counterintuitive tags on ontological categories (i.e., if Socrates was immortal 
etc.). In this respect they share some elements with primitive religion (see Boyer).  This is not a joke, nor an 
insult, but merely points out  that once one has a grasp of modern cognitive concepts, one sees that they 
apply thoughout the whole spectrum of human activity (and it would be odd if they did not).  But as 
Wittgenstein explained so beautifully, the language games and the inference engines of S2 have their 
limits--explanations come to an end--we hit bedrock (S1).  But the philosopher thinks he can see beyond it 
and walks out on the water. 
 
On pg 216 he says that making oneself so that one could not have done otherwise is a key innovation in 
the evolutionary ascent to free will, and that we can only be free if we learn how to render ourselves 
insensitive to opportunities. But where this ability resides is not revealed for several chapters!  Dennett 
has a penchant for hiding his ideas in a massive amount of rather irrelevant text. Again, he gets things 
backwards, as there is a vast body of very good evidence from biology and psychology that we get the 
feelings that we should behave in some way from our inference engines and these are not provided by 
some part of our conscious self, but by the automatic and unconscious operation of the  engines. As he 
notes, hundreds of experiments with the Prisoner´s Dilemma and related protocols have shown how easy 
it is to manipulate people´s choices and that their calculations are not conscious and deliberate at  all and 
in fact much of modern psychological, sociological and neuroeconomics research is devoted to 
distinguishing the automatisms of S1 from the deliberative thinking of S2 and showing how S1 rules.  
When the situation is manipulated to make people conscious, they are much slower and less reliable (S2). 
So, there has been constant pressure of natural selection to make the engines fast and automatic and 
inaccessible to deliberate thought. 
 
Dennett says `we make ourselves´ so that we could not do otherwise and that this is the basis of morality 
and choice. The evidence would seem to be exactly the opposite. Our inference engines give us basic moral 
intuitions and we generally act in accord with the results. If we or others do not we feel guilt, outrage, 
resentment etc., and then cheater genes will invade the population and this is one of the main theories as to 
how a good part of morality evolved. Our genes make us so we can´t (mostly) do otherwise, not our will or 
whatever Dennett thinks can do it.  We can often choose to do otherwise, but our own intuitions and the 
knowledge of social disapproval  usually serve to limit our choices. These intuitions evolved in small groups 
between 50,000 and some millions of years ago.  In the modern world, the intuitions are often not to our 
long term advantage and the social  controls weak. This is a prime reason for the inexorable progress into 
chaos in the world. 
On pg 225 he finally sneaks in a definition of free will as ´´a  complicated snarl of mechanistic causes 
that look like decision making (from certain angles)´´. He claims that this plays all the valuable roles 
of free will but lacks some (unspecified) properties possessed by traditional free will. The smoke is 
thick but I am pretty sure one of those unspecified properties is what we understand as choice.  He 
insists (top of pg 226) that hisnaturalistic account of decision making leaves plenty of room for 
moral responsibility, but making ourselves so we couldn´t do otherwise does not seem to describe 
the way we actually function, nor does it seem to leave any room for morality, as that would seem 
to consist precisely in being  able to  do otherwise. 
He does not propose any test for deciding if a choice is voluntary or forced and I doubt he could do so.  
Normally if someone asks us to move our hand, we  know what counts as having a choice, but,  typical of 
philosophers, I  expect that regardless of whether it moves or not he will count both as evidence for his 
position and of course if everything counts then nothing counts as Wittgenstein so trenchantly remarked 
many times.  
 
At this point he also starts his discussion of Libet´s well known work on conscious attention, which is the 
only part of the book that I felt was worth my time. However Libet’s claim that we make decisions without 
awareness has been debunked many times, by both psychologists and philosophers (e.g., Searle and 
Kihlstrom).  
 
 
On page 253 et  seq., he sneaks in his definition of conscious will—the ´´brains user illusion of itself´´´ which 
has as one of its main  roles providing ´´me with the means of interfacing with myself at other times``.  And 
``Illusory or not, conscious will is the persons guide to his or her own moral responsibility for action.``  He 
says  the trick we need is to see that  ``I`´ control what is happening inside the ´´simplification barrier´´... 
´´where decision making happens´´. ``Mental events´´ become conscious  by ´´entering  into  memory´´.  ´´The 
process of self  description...  is  what we  are´´.  The crucial thing is that choice is possible because the self is 
distributed over space (the brain) and time (memories). He realizes this is going to leave many incredulous 
(everyone who can follow this and really understands the bizarre language games!). ´´I know that many 
people find it hard to grasp this idea or take it seriously.  It seems to them to be a trick with mirrors, some 
kind of verbal slight of hand that whisks consciousness, and the real Self, out of the picture just when it was 
about to be introduced.´´ Many will say he took the words out of their mouth, but I would say it´s  incoherent 
and that everything we know about consciousness and the whole universe (making the obvious extensions 
of such  claims) was gone long before we got this far in his tome. And a careful look at the language games 
shows their lack of coherence (i.e., no clear Conditions of Satisfaction as I note in my articles).  
 
On pg 259 he says that culture has made us rational animals!  This is a stunning denial of human (and animal) 
nature (i.e., genetics and evolution) coming from the person who wrote ´Darwin´s Dangerous Idea´´! 
Presumably he is talking about his idea that it is memories spread over space (the brain and other people) 
and time (much like Dawkins’ memes) that give us choices and morals and consciousness (line 6 from 
bottom). He says consciousness is a user-interface but it is never made clear who or where the user is and 
how it interfaces with the brain (you will have to suffer through ´Consciousness Explained’ to find that there 
is no answer there either).  Though he makes many references to evolutionary and cognitive psychology, he 
seldom uses any of the terminology that has been current for decades (social mind, intuitive psychology, 
coalitional 
intuitions etc.) and clearly is not familiar with most of the concepts. If he means that we got the fine details 
of morality from culture, that’s ok, but this is the S2 icing on the cake and the S1 cake was baked by the 
genes. 
We are also told here that R&D (by which he means evolution here, but other things elsewhere) has given us 
the self and that language creates a new kind of consciousness and morality.  I am sure that he will get little 
agreement on this. It seems quite clear that consciousness and the basics of morality evolved in primates 
(and earlier) long before spoken language (though it is very contentious as to how language evolved from 
extant capacities in the brain).   He continues ``morality memes arose by accident some tens of thousands of 
years ago`` which would be OK if he meant the icing on the cake but he clearly means the cake! And then he 
says the point of morality is not the survival of our genes, which is an amazing (and totally incorrect) thing to 
say, even if he was only referring to memes. 
On pg 260 he claims that because we do not comprehend our ´´bland dispositions to cooperate´´, they 
mean nothing to us, but it is the operation of  our templates (i.e., reciprocal altruism promoting inclusive 
fitness)  that is everything to us. As Dawkins recently noted in his comments on E.O Wilson’s disastrous 
recent work supporting the phantasm of ‘group selection’, natural selection is inclusive fitness (see my article 
on Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’). There is ample evidence that if one of our many ‘templates’ is 
damaged, a person cannot function properly as a social being (e.g., autism). I would say it is the operation of 
the templates for intuitive psychology etc., which lead Dennett to the counterintuitive views that we do not 
have consciousness and choice in the way we think. 
He also says here that it was one of the major evolutionary transitions when we were able to change our 
views and reflect on reasons for them. This again reflects his lack of understanding of evolutionary 
psychology. I know of no evidence that the basic moral intuitions, like all the templates, are accessible to 
consciousness but there is a huge body of work showing the opposite. We may decide our cheating was 
justifiable, or forgive someone else´s cheating, but we still know it was cheating (i.e., we cannot change the 
engine). I suspect my ancestors a million years ago had the same feelings in the same situation, but what has 
happened is that there are now lots of other things that may be taken as relevant, and that sometimes 
these will lead me to act contrary to my feelings. Another issue is that as culture developed, one had to 
make many important or ´moral type` decisions for which the engines were not evolved to give a clear 
answer. 
 
On pg 267 he says that we now replace our `free floating rationales´ (probably corresponding to what 
cognitive psychologists call our templates or inference engines) with reflection and mutual persuasion. And 
on pg 286 he says that it is a child´s upbringing --demanding and giving reasons-- that affects moral 
reasoning. Again, he just has no grasp of what has happened in the last 30 years of research--the templates 
are innate S1 automatisms and cannot change with reflection or upbringing. We are then told again that 
consciousness makes moral issues available over time to the self, which takes responsibility. It is not any 
more coherent or credible with repetition. 
 
On pg 289 he has a chapter summary which repeats the mistaken notions that it is culture that makes it 
possible to reflect and that choice depends on education (memory) and sharing.  It´s clear that it is not 
culture but the inherited cognitive structures that make it possible to reflect and to choose and that culture 
determines the acceptable actions and their rewards or punishments. On pg. 303 he discusses the classic 
philosophical barrier between ´ought´ and ´is´, unaware that our templates solved that problem long ago—
i.e., they tell us how to feel about 
situations regarding other people. He also seems to be unaware that there are hundreds of ‘cultural’ 
universals implanted in our genes (e.g. see Pinker’s ´The Blank Slate´). 
 
He often starts into what looks like it’s going to be a good discussion of some issues in evolutionary 
psychology, but invariably wanders off into philosophical arcana and winds up with more confusion. This 
happens on pg. 261 where he states that concepts like ´praiseworthy´ were shaped over millennia by culture, 
while most would say the basis for such concepts is in the genes and each culture only determines the details 
of acceptable reactions to the intuitions its members get from their innate mechanisms. On pg 262 he tries 
to explain how an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy) can produce morality. His idea here is that genetic 
`R&D`(i.e., evolution) produces dim understandings of morals and then culture (memetics) produces 
variations and clarifications. I would say that we all know, and much research has made clear, that we 
commonly get very clear results from our inference engines and only dimly understand in special cases.  
Culture merely decides what we can do about our feelings. 
The last part of the book is mostly concerned with moral culpability. He refers to the legal classic by Hart 
and Honore, which I started reading 30 years ago since its authors were deeply influenced by Wittgenstein. 
Dennett tells us that we have control over our own morality and that thinking about morality will improve us. 
But, there seems no justification whatever for this view in this book. There is nothing at all here to help 
anyone escape from the dictates of the monkey mind and I am quite sure that when industrial civilization 
collapses in the 22
nd
 century people will be acting as their ancestors did 200,000 years ago. It is a defensible 
point of view that those who manage to escape do so by traveling a spiritual path that has no connection 
with philosophy- and there is not a hint of spirituality in this entire book--another telling point considering 
that many mystics have fascinating things to say about the functioning of the mind. I find more wisdom 
about how to be free and moral in any of Osho´s 200 books and tapes than anywhere in philosophy. 
Unsurprisingly, one rarely finds spiritually and morally advanced people teaching at universities. There is no 
sign here, nor in anything he has done, that Dennett is morally superior.  After 40 years of thinking about 
morality he launches personal attacks on his critics or arrogantly dismisses them. It seems clear that, like all 
of us, he is trapped in the limits of his inference engines. 
So, how much opportunity is there to improve our morality?  It seems clear (e.g., see Pinker´s 
`The Blank Slate`) that most of our behavior is genetic and the rest due to unknown factors in our 
environment, in spite of the vigorous efforts of parents and religions and  political parties. On average, 
maybe 5% of the variation in moral behavior (variations are the only thing we can study) is due to our own 
efforts (culture). The moral choices that matter most today are those affecting the fate of the world. But our 
templates were not evolved to deal with overpopulation (except by murder) and climate change (except by 
moving elsewhere and killing any opposition). 
 
How remarkable it would be if just one of the hundreds of millions of educated people in the world managed 
to figure out what consciousness or choice or any mental phenomenon really is. And if one did, we would 
expect them to be a scientist at the cutting edge of research using some exotic fMRI equipment and the 
latest parallel processing neural networked fuzzy logic computer etc. And that would only mean they specify 
the neural circuits. So they cannot answer this question at all! But it needs no answer –like the existence of 
space, time, matter, it’s just the way things are and the philosopher’s job is to clarify the language games we 
can play.  But a philosopher or physicist just sitting there thinking, coming up with the solution to the 
greatest scientific puzzle there is!  And then writing a whole book about it without checking with the sceptics 
first. To return to the quote at the beginning--´Ambition is the death of thought´. Indeed--though clearly 
Wittgenstein was thinking of profound thought! 
